In turn, a prolonged period of very low interest rates in the United States encouraged many financial professionals to take increasing risk. With interest rates so low, and debt so cheap, it was very tempting to go for a home run 3 . Indeed, low interest rates combined with a conscious push by policy makers to favor home ownership for everyone, contributed importantly to the housing boom, which became a bubble, and eventually burst.
But are these macroeconomic developments sufficient to explain what happened?
Developed countries have experienced bubbles before -the tech bubble, and housing bubbles in other countries, for example. Why, in this case, when the bubble burst, did the financial system in the United States and Europe collapse so dramatically? The magnitude and success (for now) of the rescue operations tends to make one forget the depth of the abyss into which global financial markets appeared to be plunging.
When one considers the rapidity with which strains in the mortgage markets spread through the rest of the system, one can only conclude that the financial system itself had fault lines which made it vulnerable to any important failure in any sector of the 3 markets. As mortgage markets dried up, so did markets for automobile loans, credit card loans, student loans, etc. The inter-bank market froze; there was almost a run on money markets, and bank credit to the economy came to a standstill.
Why were financial markets in the United States and Europe so vulnerable? What made them so interconnected, and so susceptible individually and jointly to seizing up?
The consensus answer seems to be 1) the complexity of and indeed the flaws in the structured products in which so many institutions in Europe and the United States invested so heavily, and 2) the startling extent of the use of leverage by these same institutions 4 .
In any financial system in which institutions borrow short and lend long, the risk of a panic is always present. If creditors loose confidence in the ability of banks or money funds or hedge funds, they may rush for the exit, and precipitate a liquidity crisis in the institutions where they have put their money. This risk is amplified if the assets which the short term borrowings have financed are opaque, and if their valuation is extremely volatile. The story of 2008 has now been told many times. The problem was not just that mortgage loans failed, but that nobody knew how bad the RMBs and CMBs and CDO squared were, and nobody knew what the extent of exposure of their counterparties was.
Financial institutions stopped lending to each other over night, because they had no way of estimating how far the problem extended. Leverage ratios of 40 and 50 to 1 exacerbated the problem many fold. An institution that has a high degree of leverage and large short term liabilities needs in a crisis to have assets that it can monetize quickly, and 4 at predictable values. The simultaneous ubiquity of opaque structured products and of excessive leverage proved to be a deadly mixture.
In retrospect, the important question is why did financial practices veer so recklessly into this danger zone? Where were the prudent bankers? Where was every participant's instinct for self preservation? Why didn't the owners of the capital that was being put at risk wave red flags?
Much has been written about incentives and governance. It is now widely appreciated that variable compensation schemes which depend on annual targets and feature no recapture asymmetrically favor risk taking. The message, "Heads I win, Tails you loose," is loaded. In the United States, the Fed has wisely proposed -and is confidant that it has the necessary authority -to bring compensation schemes into the purview of its surveillance. Moves are also afoot in the United States and elsewhere to increase the voice of shareholders. This is an important development for non-financial as well as financial corporations.
But incentives are not everything. When Bear Stearns was sold for $10, its CEO owned 6% of the firm. When Lehman filed for bankruptcy, Richard Fuld and other top executives had an overwhelming share of their wealth invested in the firm. In both cases, management's interests were very much aligned with those of share holders. And, nonetheless, management accelerated as it headed for the wall.
Fuld and many others firmly believed that what was happening could not happen, that their strategies were the right ones, and that the storm would pass. They were convinced that the structured products that they had promoted and invested heavily in were the wave of the future, and that their risk management procedures protected them 5 from default 5 . One of the surprising aspects of the financial crisis of 2008 was the degree to which the principal actors, and in fact large segments of the informed public, were convinced of the intelligence, validity and soundness of the very practices that nearly brought the system to ruin.
Economists bear a large part of the responsibility for that illusion 6 . The problem was not so much that their analyses were wrong, but that they abandoned reasonable skepticism about their conclusions. Much has been made of the fact that the econometric models which investment banks, insurance companies, and rating agencies used to value complex CDOs were misleading or inadequate 7 . They did not take sufficient account of fat tails, correlations, and confidence intervals. These are serious shortfalls for a model.
But more serious yet was the blind faith that the executives in charge put in the model results.
Much has also been made of the degree to which the perfect market paradigm was over sold. As hypotheses on how markets function, many of its tenets are useful tools of analysis. CAPM and its progeny have transformed the thinking of financial professionals, and increased the acumen and the logic of their analyses. In that sense, the assumption of perfect markets was not wrong; it was useful for certain purposes, but not for all purposes. 
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As every philosopher of science knows, any model is a simplification, a powerful tool for thinking through aspects of a problem, but a tool to be used with circumspection.
Some economists indeed made a leap of faith, and argued that the perfect model hypothesis was the most powerful tool the profession had for analyzing all important problems 8 . That view was not held unanimously. But the believers did convince a large fraction of opinion makers and political leaders of the power of their argument.
Our profession was also the purveyor of another, broader and more subtle These were the decades of the Great Moderation 9 . In these Panglossian times, it was only too easy to accept the assurances of our profession that there were no economic problems that could not be solved, and that depressions and inflations were a thing of the past.
Rational leaders who understood economics could be counted on to ensure growth and stability.
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The problem with this rosy view is that it allows and encourages people to put down their guard. If macroeconomic stability could be taken for granted, if the world was indeed becoming increasingly less risky, then previous precaution could be neglected. If all bets could be expected to succeed, there was no downside to taking on more leverage.
And the complex instruments designed by the technicians of modern finance could be initiated, sold and purchased without hesitation. Thus did economists themselves contribute to the excesses which eventually caused the system nearly to crash. Eliminating loopholes within any one country is feasible, if the political will to do so exists. Getting national authorities to agree to coordinate their regulations is another matter. If it is one of the most important priorities for regulatory reform, it is sadly also the most difficult to achieve. One has to hope that the political momentum which seems to exist now will not be wasted.
Other specific institutions and markets call for enhanced and improved regulation.
It is important that bank capital requirements be made counter-cyclical rather than procyclical. Rating agencies need attention. There is a need for institutions and regulations to ensure transparency and a level playing field in the trading of some new financial products --CDSs and other derivatives.
Beyond international coordination, the most challenging aspect of the regulatory agenda is how to deal with what has come to be known as the "too big to fail" problem.
In the last two decades, global financial markets have experienced a sequence of major crises --the Mexican Peso crisis (1994), the Asian Crisis (1997), LTCM (1998), would other players think? In the case of Lehman Brothers, the authorities felt they had no alternative but to let it fail, and may also have hoped that the example would discipline institutions that had gone too far. Paradoxically, the fall out from the failure of this institution -which was neither gigantic, nor a bank -was so catastrophic that authorities in the United States and Europe had to rush to implement the biggest package of bailouts in history. And, non one should have any illusion; the survivors read between the lines that they would all be saved. I happen to have been attending the presentation of a new fund by the CEO of a major, highly leveraged and troubled private equity firm in New York shortly after the US Congress passed TARP. One of his first remarks was, "Well, now we know that we will all still be here at the end of the day." One could not invent a clearer expression of moral hazard.
13 13 The research department of a major, global bank estimates, in the study mentioned in n. 4,the value of the implicit guarantee which the largest banks in Europe and the United States regularly receive under current circumstances as a result of being "too big to fail." The bank's estimate is between $20 and $30 billion per year.
But the deeper problem is size and concentration. If there were hundreds of different institutions, each following a different strategy and each with a different view of the world, .the authorities would have no reason to hesitate to allow one or a few of them to fail because they had made bad bets. But if a few giant institutions dominate the markets --or if one or more of them, not necessarily giants, have a strategically important position at a vital node in the relationships among many other participants--then letting one of these fail is tantamount to letting the financial system as a whole crash.
Unfortunately, changing the size and the composition of the players in global financial markets is a tall order. It is almost impossible to do by any single sweep of legislation. If it is to happen, it will have to happen progressively, over time.
The Volker rule is not the answer. The idea of the rule is that commercial banks would be prohibited from engaging in high risk activities -like proprietary trading of derivatives and in house promotion of private equity or hedge funds 14 . These activities would be pushed into "casino" banks, whose liquidity would not be guaranteed by any public authorities. The trouble with the rule is that it pushes much of modern finance into the casinos, beyond the reach of the authorities. In 2008-2009, the most spectacular failures and bail-outs involved non-banks (Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Lehman, AIG…).
Unfettered, casino finance would thrive, and the more it grew, the more one could be sure to find systemic risks among its number.
For a public body to be in a position to take actions that sanction institutions that threaten systemic stability, without itself precipitating a general collapse of markets, it must have authority over all institutions of systemic importance. It is illusory to think that 12 it could allow a systemically important institution to collapse simply because that institution had excluded itself from the authority's control.
Paradoxically, in Europe --where almost all banks are universal banks, and are likely to remain so -the authorities could be in a better position to control systemic risk than in the United States, where universal banking is less firmly established, and might indeed recede if the Volker rule is implemented. Where universal banking prevails, the banking institutions which take on more risk are just as subject to regulatory control as the plain vanilla banks.
The authority which it is most important for a regulator monitoring systemic risk to have is the authority to seize and break up a problem institution. This would mean, in the case of a giant bank which had failed, to separate the pieces and require each to stand alone. The natural tendency, in the midst of a crisis, when a regulatory authority is bailing out an institution, is towards consolidation. Very often, the regulator, under pressure to stop contagion, divides up the pieces of the failed institution and distributes them to its surviving competitors. The result is more not less concentration. To resist this tendency, authorities will need a lot of imagination, will have to be prepared well in advance, and will have to display considerable political courage. Some form of pre-arranged liquidation procedures may be the answer, but they clearly should not be drawn up by the interested parties themselves 15 .
Advance planning is necessary. But we should not delude ourselves. It is unlikely to be sufficient to forestall the next crisis, when it eventually comes. If the threat of being wiped out did not deter the manager-owners of the institutions that plunged to their 13 demise in 2008-2009, the threat of being broken up is not likely to stop them next time.
What is important is that regulators be given the authority now to break up the failed giants next time. That way, and perhaps only that way, will global financial markets evolve towards more stable structures.
We should also not be under the illusion that more competitive, less concentrated global financial structures will be immune to bouts of collective excess. It is important to remember that as the current crisis developed, almost all the major actors --including the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the U.K.
Chancellor of the Exchequer --believed unconditionally in the myth that brought the house down.
In closing, I would like to comment about financial markets in emerging Asia.
Emerging Asia, like Europe, is far from homogeneous, and comments which may be appropriate in one case may be completely off the mark in another. Nonetheless, there are two simple points that deserve to be made.
The first concerns initial conditions.
One can observe in the literature and in the public debate, a certain degree of backlash against the liberalization movement and the faith in markets which characterized the previous twenty years. This is in part a natural reaction to the overselling of the perfect market paradigm. It is also a response to the crisis itself.
Though I have argued that regulation failure was far from the whole problem, it was clearly part of the problem. A new literature is emerging, which purports to connect the origin of the crisis and also its incidence, with openness, private ownership, and international competition in financial markets. It is still unclear how this literature relates 14 to the older theme that financial openness may cause instability in the short term, but promotes economic development in the long term 16 .
It is also factually true that financial institutions in emerging Asia were, by and large, spared direct involvement in the activities that proved so destabilizing in developed markets. They did not originate and did not purchase significant amounts of structured products. In addition, their short-term foreign currency indebtedness was moderate, and the authorities in these countries held very large foreign currency reserves, available to be used as a buffer against exogenous shocks.
The knowledge that they have averted the worst of the storm, and that opinion leaders in the developed world are questioning the merits of unbridled liberalization and openness, may easily lead decision makers in Asia to conclude that the push for financial liberalization of recent years was misguided, and should be halted or reversed.
My comment on this view is that its validity depends a lot on where you stand. If your initial conditions, particularly as relates to financial markets, are those of completely open, liberalized and deregulated markets, then, indeed, it may be wise for your authorities to pause and concentrate on effective implementation of the regulations that they have. But if your initial conditions are those of a completely closed and state-owned financial system, then some degree of prudent liberalization may be an important priority.
This leads me to my second point. It is obvious that the best way to avoid a banking crisis entirely is not to have a banking system. If volatility of any kind is to be avoided at all cost, that may be a model to pursue. One should not be surprised if it tends
